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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This dissertation is geared towards providing an analytical study of the reform of the Security 
Council. This Chapter of the dissertation lays out an initial introduction. In addition, it 
illuminates on the problems which will be tackled in the dissertation as well as highlighting 
the research questions. 
Though this is a well-documented debate a justification for this particular study will also be 
provided. As a result of the wealth of literature in this particular area, a sample of the views 
held by certain authors will be given. The study which follows in the subsequent Chapters 
operates on certain hypothesis and assumptions which are highlighted below. Furthermore, 
the methods which were used in the study as well as the limitations which may arise have 
been outlined. Furthermore, tilis Chapter provides a succinct chapter breakdown of the 
dissertation. 
In totality, this dissertation aims to address two legal problems regarding the Security 
Cmmcil. The first of these is whether or not Article 23.1 of the Charter reflects the desires of 
ti1e member-states that are party to the Charter. If not what is the most suitable solution. The 
second theme is whether or not the voting system, with respect to matters which are not 
procedural (Article 27.3), is the most ideal and if not what needs to be adjusted. 
1.1 Background information 
The Security Council, from its inception in 1945 to the 21st Century, has evolved in its 
composition as well as in the manner in which it carries out its business. However, it is also 
during ti1is period that it has undergone intense scmtiny and criticism on its representative 
nature as well as its working meti10ds. 
Security Council reform has been a common area of discussion witilin the Umted Nations 
itself as well as tirroughout ti1e world generally. Alti10ugh ti1e original composition of the 
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Council from its creation at the Dtunbarton Oaks Conference1 was one which reflected the 
world of a few great powers amongst many small states, the advent of decolonisation led to a 
sharp increase in member -states of the UN which in tum led to many member states 
questioning the composition of the Security Council. 
It is tllis kind of tension imposed by member-states that led to the first reforms of the Security 
Council which took place in the 1960's2. Thereafter, there has been continuing debates and 
discussions on further refonning this sub-body in the hopes that it can become more 
representative of current realities in the international sphere. 
The debate on Security Council reform involves very intricate challenges that touches on 
aspects of political alliances between member-states, econonlical positions of member-states 
and the protection of regional interests amongst other factors. It is perhaps because of these 
elements that 'after twenty years of debate, the composition of the council remains 
tmaltered' 3. Yet, although much time has passed with little change an eagerness still exists 
amongst member-states to come up with a more representative Security Council. 
This dissertation explores key reform proposals which have been suggested, from the G-4 
recommendations of new-permanency and the Uniting for Consensus proposal to the 
Ezulwini Consensus made by the African bloc of nations, amongst others. 
Tills dissertation aims to explore the underlying arguments and belief systems that proponents 
for refonn commonly espouse in tilis debate, for example, ti1e idea that a restructuring of the 
Security Council is necessary in order to reboot the Council's 'legitimacy' in the eyes of 
other member-states. In addition many member-states who are eyeing seats in the Council 
argue that their contributions to the body reflect their worthiness to be part of the Security 
Council. An example of this is the situation of Japan. Witi1 ti1e third largest economy ($4.90 
trillion GDP)4 in the world Japan made a contribution to the United Nations regular budget 
for the year 2016 in ti1e amount of '$241,855,692' 5. This is a contribution which surpasses 
1 This conference, formally known as the 'Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security 
Organization', took place fTom August 1944 to October 1944. It preceded the ' San Francisco Conference', 
where the UN Charter was formally adopted. 
2 The Amendment of Article 23, which was adopted by the General Assembly on I ih December 1963, increased 
the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen members. The amendment created four non-
permanent seats. 
Nadin P, ' UN Security Council Reform' , Global Institutions (2016) Routledge, 67. 
4 Nadin P, 'UN Security Council Reform', Global Institutions (2016) Routledge, 55. 
5 UN Secretariat, Assessment of Member States' Advances to the Working Capital Fund for the Biennium 2016-
2017 and contributions to the UN regular budget for 2016, ST/ADM/SER.B/932, 281h December 2015, 11. 
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those made by four of the five current pennanent members of the Security Council (China, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, France and the Russian Federation). 
This dissertation also explores the belief structures of those who feel threatened by further 
refonn and who argue that an increased membership may jeopardize the efficiency of the 
Council as it stands currently. Such sentiments have been expressed by both the Russian 
Federation and the United States of America who have 'repeatedly signalled their preference 
for a compact council to insure against rampant inefficiencl. 
Therefore, there exists a need to clearly understand, from a legal standpoint, what the various 
proposals consist of as well as what their underlying rationales are. It is from this point that 
an assessment can be made on whether the legal composition of tl1e Council under Article 
23 .1 of the Charter is ideal for meeting the demands that the Security COtmcil faces today. 
In addition, the voting methods of the Council, in particular the use of the Veto, has been 
subjected to constant debate. This constant challenging has led to an amendment, but this 
amendment was made to reflect the enlargement of the Council7 and thus left the status of the 
veto-wielding states intact. 
The voting structure has been criticized on the basis that it has created a class system within 
the Council with the pennanent members arguably holding a weighty vote when it comes to 
all matters which are not procedural8. The current status quo with respect to voting has led 
some commentators to suggest that 'noting has done more to lessen public confidence in the 
United Nations than the frequent use, or abuse, of the veto in the Security COtmcil' 9. 
Therefore, this dissertation looks into the intricacies surrounding the voting structure as it 
stands and whether any of the altematives would result in a more legitimate COtmcil. 
6 Nadin P, 'UN Security Council Reform' , Global Institutions (2016) Routledge, 66. 
7 An amendment to Article 27, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 17th December 1963, provided 
that decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
(formerly seven) whilst for other matters an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) was required. 
8 Article 27.3, Charter ojl11e United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (26
111 
June 1945), 
Department of Public Information United Nations, DPV511 , Reprint (2006). 
9 A Singh S, 'The Veto Problem in the UN', The Indian Journal of Political Science (April-June 1958) Vol. 19, 
No. 2, 129-133. 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
This dissertation examines, investigates and assesses the structure of the Security Cmmcil as 
it stands under Article 23.1 of the UN Charter taking into account the proposals of reform and 
make a determination on which proposal, if any, is the most suitable. Furthermore, the study 
also seeks to evaluate the voting system, in particular that prescribed for under Article 27.3 of 
the UN Chmter and make a determination on whether a change is desirable and if so what 
that change should entail. 
1.3 Justification of the Study 
A study into the suitability of Article 23 .1 of the UN Charter can engage the various 
proposals which have been made by different member-states, groups of member-states and 
non-member state proposals (an example being civil society proposals) and seek to make a 
determination on which proposals would lead to a better constructed Secmity Council which 
maintains its efficiency and representativeness. This kind of a study is relevant in order to 
provide better clarity on the question of structural reform. Such a study is necessary because 
as of yet no solution has been found to the immense challenge of reconstructing this sub-body 
ofthe UN. 
In addition to the above it is necessary to explore the current structure of the Security Council 
as laid out in Article 23.1 of the UN Charter in order to understand how this structure relates 
to concepts such as sovereign equality10 of member-states and whether reform would result in 
better adherence to this principle, amongst others. 
As well as investigating Article 23.1 a study of Article 27.3 is key in tmderstanding what 
proposals to the voting structure would make the Council's work more efficient. It is evident 
over the past decades that the Cmmcil has been regarded as falling below the expectations 
that many had of it. These kinds of sentiments are perhaps what drove the General Assembly 
of the United Nations to pass the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution. The resolution highlights 
that if the Security Council were unable to take action with regard to a situation involving the 
use of force, this did not 'deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its 
10 Article 2.1, Charter of The United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (26111 June 1945), 
Department of Public Information United Nations, DPI/511 , Reprint (2006). 
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responsibilities tmder the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and 
security' 11 . 
Therefore, although much has been discussed armmd this area, there remains a need to add to 
these discussions by analysing which of the avenues proposed will lead to a more efficient 
Security Council which can take on the secmity challenges that lie ahead with the confidence 
of the rest of the UN community as well as the world at large. 
1.4 Objectives 
1.4.1 Main Objective 
This disse1tation seeks to examine the suitability of Alticle 23 .1 and Alticle 27.3 ofthe UN 
Charter to determine whether any amendment is required. 
1.4.2 Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of this dissertation are as follows; 
(a) To understand the technicalities of key refonn proposals and their possible 
contribution to the efficiency and representativeness of the Security Cotmcil and 
based on this to assess whether the cmTent structure of the Council is the most ideal in 
tenns of efficiency and representation. 
(b) To tmderstand the teclmicalities of the various options for alternative voting systems 
in the Council, with specific focus on the use of the Veto by the pennanent members 
and thereafter to assess whether the current voting system is appropriate in ensming 
efficiency of the Council and whether alternative systems may prove to be more 
efficient. 
1.5 Research Questions 
(a) With all the variety of proposals of reform to the structure of the Council which have 
been made, are there any in particular which would ensure greater efficiency and provide 
a fairer representation of the world commtmity making an amendment of Article 23 .1 of 
the UN Charter plausible? 
(b) Taking into account that the five pennanent members of the Council, who can use the 
'veto' power, were the nations who initially worked to create the United Nations does it 
11 UNGA, Uniting for Peace, UN A/RES/377(V) (3rd November 1950). 
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make sense to amend the voting system of the Security Council and which system can be 
used amongst those which have been suggested? 
1.6 Literature Review 
A vast amount has been written and debated upon with respect to the reformation of the 
Secwity Cmmcil. As such, tllis section aims to provide a snapshot of some of the views held 
by prominent autl10rs in tllis field. Tllis dissertation itself focuses on two main tl1emes. The 
first being structural reform and the second being the voting system. 
1.6.1 Structural Refonn 
With respect to structural reform, an adamant position for necessary reform has been made by 
Stephen Martin Walt. Professor Walt, has authored several books in tl1e area of international 
affairs including titles such as 'The Origins of Alliances' and 'Revolution and War'. 
Currently engaged as a Professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. 
Ke1medy's School of Government, Professor Walt has taken various positions with respect to 
a variety of issues, for example, the Syrian Crisis and also making comments on the case of 
Edward Snowden. One of these areas which Walt has commented on is the structure of the 
Security Council. 
In one of his articles for the Foreign Policy publication, Professor Walt acknowledges that the 
reason why permanent seats exist in the Council and are filled by the P-5 is because these 
nations won World War Two. However, in spite of tllis, he comments that 'the present 
structure is one of the world's great anachronisms' 12 . He fmther acknowledges the reality that 
Gennany has risen to the level of influence exerted by both France and the United Kingdom 
and that other nations, such as India, Japan, Brazil and South Africa are worthy candidates of 
permanent seats in a newly restructured Council. Therefore, it seems that Professor Walt's 
sentiments prescribe for a more representative composition of the Cotmcil with him admitting 
that 'the present structure makes no sense' 13 . 
12 WaltS, 'The U.N Security Council. What's up with that?', The Foreign Policy Magazine, (7th April 2015) 
<http:l/forei unpo licv.com/2015/04/07/the-u-n-securitv-council-whats-up-with-that/> last accessed 21st January 
2017. 
13 WaltS, 'The U.N Security Council. What' s up with that?' , The Foreign Policy Magazine, (7th April 2015) 
<http:l/fo reignQolicv.com/2015/04/07 /the-u-n-securitY-council -\Yhats-uQ-with-thall> last accessed 21st January 
2017. 
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In addition to Professor Walt's position on the stmcture of the Security Cotmcil, Robert 
Snyder has also made interesting points on reform. Mr. Snyder had stated in his writings that 
although he was pessimistic with regard to increasing the size of the Council, it would be 
reasonable if the Council was enlarged to accommodate States that had become powerful, to 
the same level as States like the United Kingdom. He gives the example of Germany and 
Japan14_ 
However, there are other authors who believe that no refmm on structure is needed or that 
such reform should be minimal. One example is Thomas G. Weiss. Professor Weiss is a 
Presidential Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York's Graduate 
Centre. In an occasional paper commissioned by 'Friedrich-Ebert-Stifumg' Professor Weiss 
explains that although reorganizing the structure may make the Cotmcil more legitimate, it 
will negatively impact its effectiveness. He states that the best way to make a change is to 
'reinforce pragmatic adaptations in working methods and in exploring new ones' 15 instead of 
focusing on the structure. 
In addition, Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, UK Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, made a statement in which he outlined the challenges and downfalls of enlarging the 
structure of the Council. He explained that 'too great an increase in size risks a cumbersome 
and slow decision-making process' 16. 
1.6.2 Voting System Refonn 
A wealth of observation have also been made on whether reforming the voting stmcture is 
necessary. On the one hand a band of authors suggest that voting reform is a must. Sushil 
Chandra Singh, an author in the Indian Journal of Political Science, argued that the use of the 
Veto, in particular the use by Russia, has damaged the operation of the Council. He argued 
that 'tmless some solution if found to soften the effect of veto the Security Council crumot 
work effectively' 17. In addition to this Richard Butler has made worthy comments on 
changing the system by cmtailing the use of the veto. Mr Butler, has served as Diplomat in 
14 Snyder R, 'Reforming the Security Council for the Post-Cold War World', International Journal on World 
Peace, (March 1997), Vol. 14 No. 1, 14. 
15 Weiss T, 'Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse the Implausible versus the Plausible', Dialogue 
on Globalization, (January 2005), Occasional Papers New York No. 14, 5. 
16 Statement by Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on UN 
Security Council Reform, (7°' November 2016) UN General Assembly 
<https:!/w\\\V. gov. uk!governmentlspeeches/> last accessed 22"d January 2017. 
17 Singh S, 'The Veto Problem in the UN', The Indian Journal of Political Science, (April-June 1958) Vol. 19, 
No.2, 133. 
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Residence at the Cmmcil on Foreign Affairs as well as being the executive Chairman of the 
United Nations Special Commission (the body charged with disanning Iraq). He explains that 
in order to fix the issues of the Cmmcil, the veto must be curtailed. However, although 
realizing that such a move may be unlikely, as it would disturb the status quo enjoyed by the 
P-5 its benefits would be many, ' including a long overdue revitalization of the Security 
Council's rigid and tired political environment' 18• 
On the other hand, various critics of reforming the voting system believe that at present, it 
serves its purpose. Robert Snyder has had a viewpoint on the cunent system. He suggests that 
the veto is suitable as it 'gives a derisible leadership role to the big powerso1 9. He bases this 
argument on the position that the principal of one State one vote should not be applied to all 
sub-bodies of the United Nations. In addition to Snyder's views on retaining the veto, Dr. 
Philip C. Jessup has also expressed his opinion that the veto is not the cause of all failures in 
the Council. Jessup, was a scholar, diplomat and jurist from New York City. He espoused the 
view that although the veto is a symptom (but not a cause) of the failure of the voting system, 
it acts as a ' safety-valve that prevents the UN from tmdertaking commitments ... which it 
presently lacks the power to fulfil ' 20. 
Therefore, it can be seen that divergent opinions exist on both issues of refmm, namely the 
structural question and the voting system. 
l . 7 Theoretical Framework 
This disse1tation is infonned by the natural law legal theory. In particular, attention is paid to 
the views espoused by Jolm Finnis. 
The natural law legal theory is one of the key theories which tmderpins legal discussion. It 
espouses the general view that there is a close relationship between the law and morals. As 
such laws should always be informed by moral principles. One of the main theorists that 
developed this themy is Jolm Finnis. John Finnis, an Australian legal scholar, has authored a 
variety of works including his seminal piece, Natural Law and Natural Rights. He has 
proposed his viewpoint that there exist ' fundamental goods' which everyone should seek to 
18 Butler R, ' Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered: Repairing the Security Council', Foreign Affairs (Sept-Oct 
1999)Vol. 78, No. 5, 11 . 
19 Snyder R., 'Reforming the Security Council for the Post-Cold War World' , International Journal on World 
Peace. (March 1997), Vol. 14 No. I , 13 . 
20 Singh S, 'The Veto Problem in the UN', The Indian Journal o,{ Political Science, (April-June 1958) Vol. 19, 
No.2, 131. 
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pursue. In addition he has reflected on how the law should promote the exercise of these 
goods by individuals who are subject to the law. 
In his work Finnis has commented on the types of obligation that exists in observing laws. He 
proposes that individuals have a legal obligation and a moral obligation in following laws. 
Moreover, if the law seeks to promote the common good (by guiding the community to 
achieve the fundamental goods) then the moral and legal obligation exists. However, an issue 
arises as to how a 'morally wrong law' should be treated. In response to this, Finnis argues 
that if a law is morally wrong it would be legally binding but not morally binding. That is 
individuals would have to obey it, to the extent of keeping the legal system stable but it 
would not have that moral impact. 
This theory is important to the discussion on reforming the Security Council because it can be 
argued that the current composition and voting structure must be observed, legally, but 
questions arise as to whether it is morally ideal. Various emerging powers (Japan and India) 
argue that they deserve better representation and perhaps these claims are valid. John Finnis's 
theory on the relationship oflaw and morals could assist in studying the Security Council. 
1.8 Assumptions 
The hypothesis indicated below has been reached on the following assmnptions: 
1) That an increase in the number of seats in the Security Council will complicate the 
work of the Council. 
2) That all the members of the UN Community will be pleased if there is an increase in 
the number of seats in the Council. 
3) That some of the proposals to the voting system can either make the Council more 
efficient or less efficient. 
1 . 9 Hypothesis 
This research operates on the following hypothesis. That if any of the proposals made to alter 
the structure of the Security Council as envisioned in Article 23 of the United Nations 
Charter prove to be suitable this will have a negative impact on the efficiency of the 
Council's work Even though the efficiency may drop, the sub-body will become more 
representative of the UN community. Additionally, if any of the proposals to change the 
voting system, as currently laid out in Article 27 of the United Nations Charter, are suitable, 
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this may either make the work of the Cotmcil efficient or less efficient depending on the 
precise change. 
2 .0 Methodology 
This research primarily adopted a qualitative method of study. Desktop research fonned the 
core of the research undertaken on this particular topic. The desktop research involves 
visiting various databases that can provide information on the various proposals which have 
been made, for example, the United Nations official website and subsidiary databases such a 
JStor and Cambridge University Press. 
In addition, whilst carrying out the research archiving (searching for relevant books on the 
subject ofinternational organizations and the reform of such bodies) was also used as a tool 
to gain a better tmderstanding of the situation on refonn. Moreover, the research was 
bolstered with infonnal discussions with those who have worked in the United Nations as 
well as those who have written about this area of international law. 
2.1 Limitations ofthe Study 
It is possible that in carrying out this study certain limitations will be encountered. The first 
of these is that a variety of the articles, books and related material may adopt one-sided 
arguments in assessing the question of reform. An additional limitation may be getting access 
to individuals who work or are part of the UN community who can give their opinions on the 
situation of refonn. Moreover, it may so happen that refonn does actually take place in the 
time in which this dissertation will be written and as such tilis current study may not provide 
a fresh take on reform of the Cotmcil. 
2 .2 Chapter Breakdown 
The following Chapters of this Dissertation are broken down as follows. The second chapter 
focuses on the structure of the Security Cotmcil. Tills part aims to address ti1e research 
questions wllich focus on this particular area of refonn. The tllird chapter deals with the 
voting systems of the Council. Tills part aims to answer the research questions on voting 
reform. The final chapter provides a conclusion and rec01mnendations witi1 respect to the 
statement of the problem which will fonn ti1e basis of this dissertation. 
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Chapter Two: Structural Reform of the Security Council: An analysis 
of five key Proposals 
1 .0 Introduction 
The refonn of the Security Council is perhaps one of the most intensely debated issues that 
has dominated discussions which involve the United Nations as an international organization. 
Since the early reforms of the 1960's21 which altered the struchrre of the Council there has 
been a variety of proposals which have been made to re-alter the strucrure of the Council for 
purposes of making it more representative of the entire UN community of nations. The 
following part of this dissertation involves a rigorous sh1dy of the various proposals which 
have been made by various parties in an attempt to detennine what the most suitable answer 
to the Security Council's structmal dilemma is. 
The increase in the membership of the United Nations encomaged discussions on refonnation 
of the Security Council. Since the initial change to the strucrure of the Council which came 
into force in 1965 there has been a variety of proposals which have been tabled before the 
UN community. TI1ese proposals include major-State sponsored proposals, minor-State 
sponsored proposals and academic proposals22 . In order to identifY the most suitable 
strucrure, if indeed one is attainable in the changing dynamics of international relations, these 
proposals must be examined. 
1.1 The Group ofF our Proposal 
International efforts to establish an organization which creates a platfonn for discussion and 
cooperation between States can be traced to the League of Nations, an organization which 
precedes the United Nations. The League of Nations, one of the products of the Paris Peace 
Conference, was intended to promote and maintain world peace. Although the Organization 
21 The Security Council underwent Structural Reform to increase the size of the Council from eleven members 
to fifteen. This change came into force on 31 '1 August 1965. This is reflected in the Introductmy Note in the 
Charter of the United Nations, Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information, December 
2006. 
22 Cox B, 'United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences', South 
Carolina Journal on International Law and Business (2009). 
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was a great step towards fostering international cooperation, its potential was short-lived as it 
lasted twenty-six years. The league's dissolution can be attributed to a variety of elements, 
inter alia, the absence of the USA from its members and a lack of worldwide 
representation23 . 
It is during the lifetime of the League of Nations that World War Two erupted causing a 
breakdown in international relations. The impact of World War Two on various States and 
their citizens invoked further discussion amongst the Allied powers on how best to prevent 
these events from taking place in the future. As a result of defeating Gennany, Italy and 
Japan during World War Two the Allied Powers came together to instigate the fmmation of 
the world body which today is known as the United Nations. It can be argued that the 
aftermath of World War One and the lessons learned from the League of Nation's demise 
ensured the Allied powers commitment to make the new body sustainable. 
Because of the major role which the allied powers played in the World War, namely, the 
United States of America, China, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation it 
was considered that these States should similarly assume major roles within the newly 
formed body. These nations, commonly referred to as the 'P5' occupy permanent seats 
within the Security Councif4 . The agreement that these nations would be pennanent 
members was premised on many factors including the fact that ever since the formation of the 
United Nations these States possess the most powerful military forces and had cooperated 
with each other to defeat the rise of Nazi Getmany and its allies. However, although these 
States have large militaries and extensive powers other states have emerged as contenders for 
permanent seats within the Council. These include India, Japan, Germany and Brazil. 
Together they fonn the 'Group of Four'. This perspective ofCatmcil reform can be traced to 
a draft General Assembly resolution which was tabled before the General Assembly on 6111 
July 200525 . In it the proposing member states recommended an additional six pennanent 
seats and four non-permanent seats. 
The additional permanent seats would be distributed regionally with Africa and Asia 
receiving two seats and Latin America and Western Europe receiving one seat. Whereas, with 
23 Between 1920 and 1939 a total of sixty-three States became Members however many others either revoked 
their membership e.g. Japan and Germany or never joined the League during its lifetime. 
24 Article 23.1 , Charter of The United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (261" June 1945), 
Department of Public Information United Nations, DPI/511, Reprint (2006). 
25 UNGA, Question of Equitable Reprfentation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and 
related matters, UN Res A/59/L.64 (6 July 2005). 
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respect to the non-permanent seats, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America would 
each receive one seat. The dtive for an expansion, in the context of the Group of Four 
Proposal, is due to the scale of growth of the four nations, namely, Germany, India, Brazil 
and Japan. These states have emerged as major global players with two of the four cotmtries 
also forming part of the BRIC group of states which has been argued will have a 'major 
impact on the global economy during the coming decades ' 26. When considering India's 
economic rise over the past decades it is arguable that its international influence will continue 
to rise as its 'economy is the 1oth or 11th biggest in the world and is forecast to reach third, 
after the US and China, in less than fifteen years '27. 
Therefore, it seems as though the Group of Four proposal would be an ideal plan for the 
structural expansion of the Security Council, however this plan has received its criticism from 
various member States, some of them being permanent members in the Council itself. A key 
example of this is the relationship between China and Japan. Although the United States of 
America has indicated its support for Japan to receive a pennanent seat if refonn does take 
place, China has on many occasions signalled its disapproval. This disapproval stems from 
the Chinese Government itself to the grassroots where 'a campaign to keep Japan out of the 
Security Cotmcil has gathered some 22 million signatures, increasing the chances that China 
will block Japan's bid to join the group'28 . This tension demonstrates the political climate in 
which Security Council reform is being debated. 
This kind of tension introduces into the structural debate the relationship that exists between 
member States. In the case of Japan and China, there remain constant challenges, for 
example, both States assert sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands29. It therefore makes 
Japan's bid more difficult and arguably creates more tension between China and the USA, a 
State that wishes to foster better relations with both States. Therefore, this Proposal suffers 
from the inherent tension that exists between competing States that are from the same region. 
26 Groot S & Others, ' The Rise of the BRIC Countries and its impact on the Dutch Economy', CPB Background 
Document on Request by the MinistiJ' ofEconomic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (2011). 
27 Burke J, 'Now India is Growing fast it's time to update our tired image of the country ' (14th February 201 6), 
<https:/ /www. the guardian. corn/comrnentisfree/20 16/feb/14/india-economy-growth-west> last accessed 30u' July 
2017. 
28 ' 22 Million Chinese seek to Block Japan' s bid to join U.N Council' , The New York Times (31 st March 2005), 
<!:ill_p:/ / WI\'\ v. n Yli mes. com/200 5/03/31/internat io nal/asi a/22-mi IIi on-chinese-seek-to-block-japans-bid-to- i o in-
un.html> last accessed 30th July 2017. 
29 These Islands have been a source of conflict between China and Japan since the 1970 ' s. It is claimed that they 
are rich in gas and oil resources. 
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A cmcial ground on which all the four members namely, Gennany, Japan, India and Brazil 
seek permanent seats is with respect to United Nations monetary contribution. When 
comparing the contributions made by the Group of four members to those made by some of 
the permanent members it is evident that the Group of four, at ce1tain periods, are 
contributing more. The table below demonstrates that when comparing the contributions of 
Japan and Germany vis-a-vis the United Kingdom ar1d France, the States who do not have 
permanent seats are contributing more to the United Nations regular budgee0. 
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In addition to United Nations monetary contributions to the regular budget it is arguable that 
in certain periods member States of the Group of Four contribute more in tenns of UN 
Military Experts on mission, Staff Officers and military troops. The table below illustrates 
that as of 301h June 2017 both Brazil ar1d India have made more contribution in this area when 
compared to France and the United Kingdom31 . 
30Assessment of Member States ' Advances to the Working Capital Fund for the Biennium 2016-2017 and 
Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for 2016, UN Secretariat, 28th December 2015, 
ST/ADM/SERB/932. 
31 Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post, Police, UN Military Experts on Mission, 












Brazi l France India Unit "!ci Kingdom 
The above demonstrates that the Group of Four proposal has emerged at a time when the four 
nations are growing economically and therefore there is pressure from these nations to be 
considered in any refonn package. This Proposal is progressive as it reflects the reality that 
Japan, India, Brazil and Germany are just as influential on the international platfonn as the 
other permanent members. In addition, it is a great refonn package as it guarantees more 
seats for regions, which in the past have been arguably marginalized, for example, giving 
Africa three seats (two pennanent and one non-permanent seat). 
1.2 The Uniting for Consensus Proposal 
Although the Group of Four Proposal seems to be suitable by distributing the new pennanent 
seats amongst four regional areas (Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western Europe and Other 
States) there has been disagreement between the Group of Four and another group of States 
referred to as Uniting for Consensus, but also tenned the 'Coffee Club'. Tllis disagreement is 
evident, for example, a meeting in 2005 convened by fanner Secretary General Kofi Alman 
proved to be ' a futile exercise with the two sides failing to find a meeting ground' 32. Initially 
led by Italy, this group of nations argue that the Group of Four proposal adds to the 'class' 
system of the Security Cmmcil. The Uniting for Consensus Proposal focuses on increasing 
32 'Differences between G-4, Coffee Club over UN seat remain', 24111 May 2005 
<ht t ps ://\ vw\ v. out I ook india. com/ne\ VS \ \·ire/ ston -! di IT eren ces-bet\ veen-g-4-coffee-c lu b-o ver -un-seat-
remain/3001 09> last accessed 16°' August 2017. 
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non-permanent membership from the current ten members to twenty members33 . The non-
permanent section of the Council, under tlris proposal, have a tenme of two years with the 
possibility of immediate re-election. 
This perspective of focusing on increasing non-pe1manent seats instead of creating permanent 
seats is based on better representation. Allan Rock, former Canadian Ambassador to the 
United Nations, when presenting the Uniting for Consensus Proposal argued that 'widening 
the petmanent circle for the few who sought special status, would make tl1e Cotmcil less 
accountable for its conduct, more remote from the memberslrip and less representative of the 
world's regions' 34 . Moreover, Marcello Spatafora, fonner Italian Ambassador to the United 
Nations also argued that the 'G-4 model was structured in a way to benefit just six 'happy 
few', at the detriment of all the other 180 member States, and with a tremendous divisive 
impact on the memberslrip' 35 . This demonstrates that the deliberations between the 'Coffee 
Club' States was geared towards creating a reform package which did not favour a handful of 
Sates but would give the larger majority the chance to serve more frequently and for longer 
periods depending on their popularity within a particular region when it comes to 
contributing to tl1e maintenance of international peace and security. 
It would seem that like the Group of Four proposal the Uniting for Consensus Proposal has its 
critics and supporters. However, it is arguable that support of this proposal amongst the 
ctUTent permanent membership is stronger than that of the Group ofFom proposal. This is so 
with respect to China. Clrina has openly disapproved of Japan's lobbying for a pennanent 
seat on the Council however, remarks made by Ambassador Wang Guangya in 2005 at a 
meeting of the Uniting for Consensus Group suggests China's support of the Umting for 
Consensus initiative. Tlris is so as he stated that 'China embraces this initiative and supports 
all efforts made in tl1is regard. ' 36 TI1is Proposal can be seen as a backlash from a group of 
States which are said to be 'Iivals' to the Group ofFour. 
33 UNGA, Question on equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and 
related matters, UN A/59/L. 68 (21st July 2005). 
34 ' Uniting for Consensus' Group of States Introduces Tex1 on Security Council Reform to General Assembly, 
26°' July 2005, GA/10371 <https://www.un.org/press/en/2005/ga1037 l.doc.htm> last accessed 16th August 
2017. 
35 Uniting for Consensus' Group of States Introduces Text on Security Council Reform to General Assembly, 
26°' July 2005, GAll 0371 <https://www. un. org/press/en/2005/ga I 037l.doc.htm> last accessed 16th August 
2017. 
36 Remarks by Ambassador Wang Guangya at meeting on ' Uniting for Consensus ', 11th April 2005, 
<http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/zzhgg/tl91026.htm> last accessed 30th July 2017. 
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The Uniting for Consensus Proposal, in theory, provides a great opporttmity for a larger and 
more representative Catmcil. However, it can be argued that by simply increasing the non-
permanent section of the Council there would still remain the dominance which is exercised 
by the permanent five members. This drawback is less evident under the Group of Four 
proposal because under that proposal there would be an increase in pennanent members to 
include emerging nations is regions which have arguably not been represented adequately, for 
example, Africa. 
1.3 The Ezulwini Consensus 
Another interesting Proposal which has been made for structural refonn takes into account 
the perspective of States in · Africa. This perspective focuses on the creation of both 
permanent and non-permanent seats. This would seem more in line with the Group of Four 
Proposal as opposed to the Uniting for Consensus Proposal which focuses primarily on the 
creation of new non-pennanent seats. 
The Ezulwini Consensus is a proposal which has grown from the d1ive of African nations for 
a more representative Catmcil. This is evident as the African Union Heads of State meetings 
are a common forum where such discussions are held. For example, Heads of State at the 53-
nation African Union Summit in Ahuja, Nigeria were ' seeking ways to ensure progress for 
the continent and better representation at the United Nations Security Council' 37. The 
Proposal views a more representative Council as having an additional six pennanent seats as 
well as five non-permanent seats. When considering the new pennanent seats Afiica and Asia 
would each receive two whereas Latin America and Western Europe would each receive one. 
With respect to non-pennanent seats Afiica would receive two whereas Asia, Eastern Europe 
and Latin America would each receive one seat. 
The Ezulwini Consensus leans more towards giving greater representation to the African 
region. Tllis would seem ideal because as of the 30th June 2017 there is a total of sixteen 
peacekeeping operations taking place. Out of this total munber nine are taking place in the 
African Region38. This raises the argument that the Secmity Council would be able to 
properly discharge its primary responsibility of the maintenance of international peace and 
37 ' African Leaders seek progress, Better Representation' ' 2t 11 October 2009 <https://www. \'Oane\YS. com/a/a-
13-2005-01 -30-Yoa28-66362452/546360.html> last accessed 17u' August 2017. 
38 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Fact Sheet (301h June 2017). 
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security if there was more representation from the region where peacekeeping missions are 
more predominant. It is arguable that with more representation on the Cmmcil from African 
States the Council may be able to respond more effectively towards conflict that may arise in 
this region. 
This proposal, it can be argued, stems from the growth and influence of African States in 
international relations. Indeed it has been commented that 'No one at San Francisco in 1945 
could in their wildest dreams have imagined that Africa would have a major role in the 
United Nations, let alone imagine that its meetings would be filled with representatives from 
thirty-four independent African States, the largest continental representation in the 
organization' 39. However, this viewpoint is no longer applicable as the African region now 
constitutes the majority of states in the General Assembly of the United Nations. In addition, 
the economies of various African States have boomed with 'six of the ten fastest growing 
economies in the world being in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mozambique, Rwanda, Angola, 
Nigeria, Chad and Ethiopia'40. 
Furthermore, there are certain African states which have played a significant role in 
international affairs, for example, Nigeria. 'Nigeria has participated in various UN peace-
keeping operations in Congo, Lebanon, Angola, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda' 41 . 
Therefore, this proposal is a great step forward as it expressly recognizes the need for Africa 
to be better represented on the Cmmcil. In addition, it brings to light the political as well as 
economic rise of African States in the international sphere and their need to be better 
represented on the Security Council. However, this proposal can arguably be criticized on the 
basis that it leans more in favour of Africa whilst neglecting other regions such as Eastern 
Europe. Whilst tmder this plan Eastern Europe would only receive one non-permanent seat, 
under the Uniting for Consensus Plan Eastern Europe would receive two seats and Africa 
would receive six seats. Therefore, when comparing these two proposals the latter seems to 
provide better representation to both regions as opposed to one over tbe other. 
39 Hovet T, 'The Role of Africa in the United Nations', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol354, July 1964, 124. 
40Akyeampong E & Fofack H, 'Five Centuries ago Africa was Booming: it can rise again' , 91h September 2015 
<https:/ /www. the guardian. com/comrnentisfree/20 15/sep/09/africa-rising-people-economies> last accessed I st 
August 2017. 
41 Nwosu N, 'Nigeria and the Quest for Security Council's Permanent Membership: Problems and Prospects' , 
Pakistan Institute of international Affairs, Vol49, No.3 July 1996,42. 
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1.4 The Italian Proposal 
As well as their being major state proposals there have also been proposals made by 
independent member States. Although it can be argued that Italy spearheaded the Uniting for 
Consensus Proposal in order to challenge the Group of Four Proposal there is also an initial 
independent Proposal made by Italy. This perspective differs from the others which have 
been explored. 
Under this perspective, rather than being a sub-body which is made up of member-states the 
Security Council would accommodate 'regional seats' . That is to say that each seat would 
represent one of the various regions adopted in the workings of the United Nations. The idea 
behind tlris approach is to give member states more access to the Security Council as the 
regions would be able to rotate member states in and out of the Cmmcil. TI1is perspective on 
Security Council reform has gathered support within and outside the United Nations 
community as 'regional associations could then be expected to deepen tl1eir common security 
and foreign policy in order to ensure their representativeness for the region concerned as well 
as the effectiveness of the Council' 42 . 
However, it is worthy to note that although regional seats may foster solidarity and better 
represent regional interests rather tl1an individual state interests, such a structure may lead to 
inefficiency if disagreement exists within particular regions. 
1.5 Model X - An Academic Proposal 
A further perspective of structural reformation is what is referred to as tl1e 'Model X' plan. 
This plan builds on Plan A and B wlrich was set out in the United Nations repmt entitled 'A 
more secure world: Our shared responsibility' . 
This Proposal differs from others as it seeks to keep the memberslrip number low by adding 
only five new seats in the Council. However, these would be four- year renewable seats. 
From these seats there would be 'two four-year renewable seats for Africa, two for Asia and 
42 Schrijver N, 'Refonning the UN Security Council in Pursuance of Collective Security', Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law, Issue 1 March 2007, 135. 
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one for the Americas and the Pacific'43 . Such an outlook on the structure of the Cotmcil 
creates what can be referred as 'semi-permanent' members. Although some may argue that it 
creates another 'class' within the Council it could be equally argued that such a structure 
would give greater representation to regions which until recently have not been adequately 
represented. 
1.6 Analysis of Competing Proposals 
The various proposals to the structure of the Security Cotmcil encompass different variations 
of making the sub-body more representative whilst attempting to maintain and perhaps 
improve its efficiency. Each of the discussed Proposals have their individual merits and 
drawbacks. 
By way of example, the Uniting for Consensus Proposal would highly benefit tl1e linage 
which the Security Council has of being in an 'anachronistic state'44 . By focusing primarily 
on the expansion of non-permanent seats the Proposal does not contribute to the 'class-
system' which would contilme to exist if additional permanent seats are created. 
Conversely, it has been argued that enlarging the non-petmanent section fmther complicates 
the situation. Germany, through its representatives, stated in the reform debate of the 63rd 
session of the General Assembly 'that expanding tl1e Council with only non-pennanent 
members would merely add more voices to t11e 'Chou·' rather than change the 'song' of the 
Council' 45 . Thus, a Proposal which adds more permanent and non-permanent seats would 
seem ideal. This is what the Group of Four Proposal recommends. 
In addition to the above the Ezulwini Consensus raises legitilnate concerns of African 
Nations for better representation on the Cotmcil. This Proposal, unlike the other four leans in 
favour of a region that has the highest population of States in the world and in tl1e UN 
Community of States. 
A key element of the debate on structural refonn is the fear amongst many stakeholders that 
an increase in Council membership will decrease efficiency. For example, James D Fearon, 
Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, expressed his viewpoint in his 
43 Cox B, 'United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences', South 
Carolina Journal of International Law and business, Volume 6, Issue 1 Fall, 114. 
44 Mishra M, 'The United Nations Security Council: Need for a Structural Change?' , The Indian Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 68, No. 1 (January- March 2007), 145. 
45 Lund J 'Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform', 191h January 2010, Centre for UN Reform Education 
' tl 
<http://wW\Y.eenterforunreform org/?g=nocle/414> last accessed 17 'August 2017. 
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comments of the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. He 
argues that 'the overall impact on effectiveness could actually be negative if increasing the 
size of the Council makes it harder to get good resolutions passed in the first place'46. 
Although these viewpoints exist a study carried out by Aris Alexopoulos and Dimitris 
Bourantonis found that increasing membership of the Council would not decrease efficiency. 
In their study, the authors suggest that 'if policy-makers' goal is to expand the UNSC, in 
order to make it more representative, they could proceed without losing in efficiency'47. 
The above demonstrates that all the Proposals analysed above have their merits. They each 
propose an increase in membership although with a variance of focus on different regions in 
the World. Therefore, it can be concluded that each of the Proposals have made a beneficial 
contribution to the continuing debate on possible stmctural refmm of the Security Council. 
46 'Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, Proceedings of a Workshop to Analyse the Report of 
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change', Yale Centre for the Study of Globalization, March 
2005, 101. 
47 Alexopoulos A & Bourantonis D, 'Can Expansion lead to a more efficient UN Security Council? A Veto 
Players Analysis ', 24. 
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Chapter Three: An analysis ofthe Voting System of the United 
Nations Security Council 
1.0 Introduction 
Any Organization's peiformance depends on the internal system which is used to allow it to 
make decisions and act when presented with challenges. The Security Cotmcil is no exception 
to tllis. Since its inception tl1e Council has evolved in its methods of operation and working 
methods in order to meet the needs of world affairs at a particular point in time. Such 
progress has been recognized by many including H.E Ambassador Dr. Ion Jinga who 
remarked in a statement that, 'significant progress has been achleved in the last couple of 
years in adapting the methods of work to the new global realities' 48 . 
This Chapter of the Dissertation will focus on studying the evolution of the working methods 
of the Council in order to determine the plausibility of the system as it currently stands. 
Additionally, this Chapter will also consider the use of the 'Veto' power which is granted to 
permanent members tmder the Charter of the United Nations49 . Certain proposals to the 
Veto's reform and questions of its complete abolition will also be explored. 
1.1 Analysis of the Working Methods 
The improvement on the working methods of the Council has been an ongoing process since 
the Council began its work. This has been a necessary step for tills body to take because as 
there has been a growth in conflicts following the end of tl1e Cold War tl1ere bas been a 
growth in the workload of the Council. As such 'from a body that for decades met only 
sporadically, ranging from a few times a year to a few times a montl1, the Cotmcil in 1993 
turned into one that held 153 fonnal meetings and 252 sessions ofinfonnal consultations' 50. 
48 HE Ambassador Dr. Ion Jinga, Statement at the Security Council Open Debate on the Working Methods of 
the UN Security Council, 19111 July 2016 <ht1ps: //mpne\n•ork.mae.ro/en/nodell914> last accessed 1 ih 
September 2017. 
49 Article 27 .3, Charter of The United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (26°1 June 1945), 
Department of Public Information United Nations, DPI/511 , Reprint (2006). 
50 ' Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Efforts to Reform Council Working Methods 
1993-2007', Security Council Report, Special Research Report 2007 No. 3, 18th October 2007. 
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The procedure which the Security Cmmcil was to adopt was to always be formed by the 
Council itself51 . As such, in its early years the Executive Committee of the UN Preparatory 
Mission was tasked with fonning the initial Provisional Rules of Procedure. The work of tltis 
Commission resulted in the document S/96/Rev.7 which outlined the Procedural Rules to be 
followed by the Council Members. Since its initial adoption the Rules have been amended a 
further eleven times as the circumstances ofthe Council's work has changed. 
The initial Provisional Rules of Procedure were a positive foundation on wltich the Council 
could begin its work. It covers various key areas such as the Agenda, the Presidency and 
publicity of meetings. With respect to the Agenda t11e Rules provided that t11e Secretruy-
General would produce a provisional agenda which would be used in an upcoming Cmmcil 
meeting upon the approval of the President of the Council52 . Additionally, the Rules also 
specified t11at the Presidency would rotate monthly amongst all tl1e members of the Cmmcil 
according to the order in which the first letter of the Member States' name appeared in the 
English alphabet53 . 
Despite its ability to allow the Council to carry out its work it was discovered that further 
changes to the working methods would be required. An important move in tltis direction of 
change was the Note issued by the President of the Security Cmmcil in 2006 recorded in the 
UN document S/2006/507. This docmnent provided various amendments to the previous 
Rules which the Cmmcil used. When comparing the new measures lmder tltis document with 
the Provisional Rules various elements differ. Firstly, the 2006 edition prescribes that the 
'provisional agenda for formal meetings of the Council should be included in the Journal of 
the United Nations' 54. Tltis is different from what previously existed where the Agenda 
would be set amongst the Council members. Tltis provision is in line with the call of 
observers and non-Council members encouraging transparency and accmmtability in the 
working methods of the Council. 
Moreover, under the 2006 edition there IS express recognition of the members of the 
Council's intent to 'intensify their efforts to publicize decisions and other relevant 
information of the Council and its subsidiruy bodies to the Member-States and other 
51 Article 30, Charter of The United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (26th June 1945), 
Department of Public Information United Nations, DPI/511 , Reprint (2006). 
52 Rule 7, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, S/96/Rev. 7, United Nations Publications, 
Sales No. E83.l4. 
53 Rule 18, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, S/96/Rev. 7, United Nations Publications, 
Sales No. E.83.I4. 
54 Article 1.1 , Note by the President of the Security Council, S/20061506, 191h July 2006. 
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Organizations through correspondence, websites, outreach activities and other means, when 
appropriate' 55 . In comparison the Provisional Rules lacked this access to documentation. By 
way of example, the previous Rules indicated that upon receiving all documents that were 
considered confidential from the Secretary-General the Security Cotmcil would decide 
'which of these shall be made available to other members of the United Nations, which shall 
be made public and which shall continue to remain confidential'56. 
However, the adaptation of the Council's working methods did not stop in 2006. The 
Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (A working 
group set up to assist in streamlining the methods of the Council) updated the 2006 measures 
which resulted in the President's Note S/2010/507. Under this note further amendments were 
made to the working methods with the aim of improving the efficiency, transparency and 
accountability of the Security Council. 
Under the 2010 edition of the working methods it specifies that Council members 'intend to 
invite the Chairs of Cotmtry-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to 
participate in fonnal Security Council meetings at which the situation concerning the Country 
in question is considered'57. This is a new measure which the Cotmcil developed which was 
not present under the 2006 Presidential Note. Additionally, the 2010 edition makes provision 
for Security Council Missions. It prescribes that 'members of the Secmity Council will 
designate a member or members to coordinate a particular Security Cotmcil mission' 58. 
In addition to the above developments of the working methods of this body another key 
measure which has grown in popularity is the use of' Arria-Fonnula' meetings. Initiated by 
Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, these are 'very infonnal, confidential gatherings 
which enable Security Cotmcil members to have a frank and private exchange of views with 
persons whom the inviting member or members of the Cotmcil believe it would be beneficial 
to hear and/or to whom they may wish to convey a message' 59. 
The above demonstrates that the Security Cotmcil has tmdergone significant change with 
respect to its working methods. These changes are arguably positive as they seek to make the 
55 Article III.lO, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/2006/506, 19th July 2006. 
56 Rule 57, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, S/96/Rev. 7, United Nations Publications, 
Sales No. E.83.l4. 
57 Article X.61 , Note by the President of the Security Council, S/2010/507, 26th July 2010. 
58 Article XI.66, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/2010/507, 26tl' July 2010. 
59 Informal Non-Paper of 25th October 2002, prepared by the United Nations Secretariat 
<hnp:l/ww\Y.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml> last accessed 17tl' September 2017. 
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work of the Council more transparent and inclusive with respect to the general public as well 
as the wider UN Community. 
1.2 Analysis ofthe ' Veto ' 
In addition to the working methods of the Council another key area which is hotly debated 
regards the voting powers which five out of the fifteen Council-members have. The 
permanent members of the Security Council which include the USA, the Russian Federation, 
China, UK and France all possess what is referred to as the 'veto' power. That is to say that 
in order for a non-procedural matter to pass in the Cmmcil it requires the affirmative vote of 
nine members 'including the concurrent votes of the pennanent members' 60. As such tiris 
state of affairs has been described by a diplomat as being one in which 'the Security Cmmcil 
is a club and the P5 is club within a club' 61. However, it is worthy to note that when 
procedural matters are being voted upon, there must be nine affinnative votes. Therefore, it is 
possible for procedural resolutions to pass despite a lack of affirmative votes :fi:om all of the 
five permanent members. 
Despite ti1e vast criticism which has been levelled against tiris aspect of ti1e Security Council 
there are argun1ents which exist for maintaining the voting powers of the permanent five 
Council members. It is argued that 'overall use of the veto has declined markedly since the 
end of the Cold War'62. To a certain extent tlris assessment is accurate especially witi1 respect 
to two permanent members namely, ti1e UK and France. The first table below indicates the 
mm1ber of times both these members have used their veto power in two periods. The first 
period being between the years 1980-2000 and the second period being between ti1e years 
2000 to 2017. The first table illustrates ti1at between the years 1980 to 2000 ti1e UK and 
France used the veto power 14 times and 7 times respectively. However, from the years 2000 
to 2017 both member States have not used the veto power. 
60 Article 27.3, Charter of The United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (26th June 1945), 
Department of Public Information United Nations, DPV511 , Reprint (2006). 
61 Okhovat S, The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Ref orm, CPACS Working Paper No. 
15/1. December 2011. 
62 B-osco D, ' In Defence of the Veto Power', 31'1 January 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/0l/31/in-
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Conversely, it can be argued that there has been an increase in the use of the Veto with 
respect to two other permanent members namely, China and Russia. The table below 
demonstrates that from the years of 1980 to 2000 China and Russia used the veto power twice 
and six times respectively. However, from the years 2000 to 2017 China and Russia used the 
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In addition to the reasoning that the veto is used sparingly in more recent times it has been 
argued that without the existence of this voting power to defeat any resolution dealing with a 
substantive matter there would not be a Security Council to speak of. When the United 
Nations was fonned in 1945 it was agreed that the five victors of the Second World War 
63 Security Council- Veto List, <ht1 p:/!research. un.org{enldocs/sc/guick> last accessed 181h September 2017. 
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would receive permanent membership in the Security Council along with the power to cast a 
negative vote which would defeat any resolution except for one dealing with a procedural 
matter. Tilis was an assurance which did not exist under the United Nations' predecessor, the 
League of Nations and which it can be argued, inter alia, led to its failure. Additionally, it has 
been argued by some that 'the veto allows Security Council members, to set aside those 
issues on which they cannot agree but to remain engaged on those others- the great majority 
of cases- where they can' 64 . 
However, although it seems ideal that the power to use the veto exists so as to entice the 
permanent members, who all have nuclear capabilities, to stay focused on maintaining 
international peace and security there has been a growth in discussion to either dispel with the 
veto power altogether or to limit its use to certain areas of international affairs. With respect 
to its limitation there are those who argue that the veto's use should not be adopted in events 
which result in mass-atrocities, crimes against humanity and genocide. As such 'the moral 
argmnent that the veto should not be used in cases of mass-atrocity crimes in 
overwhelming' 65 . 
Instead of limiting the Veto's use in the above instances there are others who support the 
argument that this privilege which is held by five out of fifteen Council members should be 
disbanded altogether. It is argued that 'the use of the veto throughout the UN' s llistory has 
been responsible for the body's failure to act during many of the worst crises' 66. However, 
this proposition would remain hard to achieve. This is so because any amendment to the 
Charter requires the agreement of 'all the permanent members of the Security Cmmcil' 67 . 
Despite the obvious challenge in changing this state of affairs there is still strong dissent over 
the veto's existence in current times. In a dialogue on UN Refonn which took place in the 
New York Times one commentator argued that the veto is 'a relic of World War II subject to 
64 Davies S & Bellamy A, 'Don't be too quick to condemn the UN Security Council power ofVeto ', 12'h August 
20 14, <htt ps :1 /thecon versation. com/ dont-be-too-g uick -to-cond emn-l he-un-securi tv-counci 1-pO\ ver -of-veto-
29980> last accessed 18th September 2017. 
65 Evans G, 'Should the UN Security Council veto be limited?' 5th February 2015, 
<ht tps ://www. \Yeforum. org/agenda/20 15/02/should-the-un-securit , ·-counci !-veto-be-l imitecl/> last accessed 18th 
September 2017. 
66 Petiya S, 'Abolish the Veto Power in the United Nations Security Council', 6th July 2009, 
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abuse, it is largely responsible for the Cmmcil's impotence'68 . As such the commentator 
argued that 'the veto should be replaced by majority or supermajority vote, on either a state 
or population basis' 69 . 
Additionally, there are arguments that the special voting powers of the permanent five should 
be limited as a result of the use of what is tenned the 'tmreasonable veto'. The tmreasonable 
veto is the use of the special voting privileges by either of the permanent five in order to 
prevent or impede the Council from taking a certain course of action. TI1e use of this term by 
member-states and Commentators was very popular with respect to Security Cmmcil 
Resolution 1441. By way of example, Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, stated 
that the UK would take action if another Council member 'imposed an unreasonable veto in 
the Security Council'70. This remark was made in response to France's disapproval of the 
USA and UK's assessment that an interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1441 
pennitted the use of force in Iraq. Therefore, France was inclined to use its Veto on any 
fmther resolution giving permission for the use of force and such a use would have been 
considered 'tmreasonable' by France's allies in the Secmity Council. 
Moreover, there has been an emerging trend by pennanent members of the Cmmcil to abstain 
when resolutions are being voted upon. This trend was given recognition by the International 
Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion regarding the occupation of Namibian ten·itory by 
South Africa71 . The Court expressed the viewpoint that 'by abstaining, a member does not 
signifY its objection to the approval of what is being proposed; in order to prevent the 
adoption of a resolution requiring unanimity of the permanent members, a pennanent 
member has only to cast a negative vote'72. Therefore, the International Court of Justice 
interpreted an abstention as a 'concuning vote' rather than a negative vote. As such an 
abstention would not be counted as a vote in the Security Council whereas in compruison an 
abstention made by a Member State in the General Assembly would be cotmted as a vote. 
This practise by the permanent members, it can be argued, is more beneficial for the 
68 Nabaum A, 'Creating a Stronger U.N' , New York Times, 13th December 2014, 
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Council's work as opposed to the use of the 'Veto' power. A notable example of its use is with 
respect to Security Council Resolution 2334. This Resolution outlined Israeli's settlement 
construction as being 'flagrant' and contrary to international law. Although the USA is seen 
as a strong ally oflsrael, the USA abstained in this case. As a result, 'loud applause was heard 
in the packed chamber when the US Ambassador, Samantha Power, abstained'73 . Therefore, 
this option which is open to permanent members to abstain arguably provides a better 
alternative to the use ofthe 'Veto' power. 
The above discussion demonstrates the complexities surrounding the debate on reform of the 
Security Council's working methods and use of the 'Veto' by the five permanent members. 
Witl1 respect to the working methods although there is constant debate on making the internal 
system of the Council more streamlined it is evident that progress has been made in making 
the Council's work more transparent, accountable and inclusive. Moreover, when considering 
the use of the 'veto' power there are arguments which protect its use as being a 'necessary 
evil' to ensure that the big powers in the world remain enticed to engage in discussion and 
take action to maintain international peace and security. On the other hand, there are 
dissenting views which hold that the veto no longer serves the world community but rather 
that it stifles many attempts to secure peace and security. Proponents of the view that the 
Veto is a hindrance to the Council's work argue that there should be agreed limitations on its 
use. However, there are many Member-States, for example Lithuania, and commentators 
alike that believe that the best alternative to limitation is to completely abolish the use of the 
'veto'. 
73 Beaumont P, 'US abstention allows UN to demand end to Israeli Settlements', The Guardian, 23rd December 
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Chapter Four: Recommendations and Conclusion 
1.0 Recommendations on Security Council Structural Reform 
There is no doubt that discussions on Structural refonn continue to provide unique challenges 
to various stakeholders involved in this area of debate in international law. These challenges 
include attempting to balance the various interests of Member States in the United Nations 
Community as well as other entities outside the United Nations Community, for example, the 
General Public. Despite these constant challenges various proposals have been made to 
attempt to make this organ of the United Nations better representative of the entire United 
Nations Community. 
One of the Proposals as analysed in Chapter Two is the Uniting for Consensus Proposal. 
'Uniting for Consensus Members argue that their solution makes the most logical sense from 
an unbiased perspective and is the only solution that will work in the long term'74. Although 
this Proposal is seen as one that attempts to create a Security Council which has been argued 
would be better a representative of the United Nations Commmrity of Member-States, it 
allows the status and subsequent power of permanent membership to be left to only five 
Member-States. This position can change under the Group of Four proposal which looks at 
including Member-States which have acquired a large economic and nrilitary position in 
international affairs into acquiring permanent membership status, however, the position 
cannot change if the Uniting for Consensus Proposal is implemented. In addition to the 
Uniting for Consensus Proposal, another Proposal discussed in this dissertation is the 
Ezulwini Proposal. 
This Proposal, within the context of the structural refonn debate, is essential as it 
demonstrates the necessity for better representation of Africa in the Security Council. 
However, it can be argued that the Group of Four Proposal satisfies this necessity whilst 
achieving other objectives such as recognizing the emergence of other Member-States other 
than the cuuent Pennanent Five. The Ezulwini Consensus is very similar to the Group of 
74 Minor A, 'Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A Rope of Sand', Fall 2010, SIT Digital 
Collections, <http.://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgilvie\vcontent.cgi?art icle=l974&context=isJLC.Qllect io_rr> 
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Four Proposal in tenns of new seats (both permanent and non-permanent). The difference 
between the two is that the Ezulwini Consensus creates an extra non-pennanent seat for an 
African State. As such although this Proposal is important and has certain strengths, an 
alternative Proposal (the Group of Four Proposal) achieves a similar outcome. 
As well as the Uniting for Consensus Proposal and the Ezulwini Proposal, the Italian 
Proposal to stmctural reform was also analysed. This Proposal takes an alternative approach 
by advocating for 'regional seats' as opposed to individual 'Member-State' seats. Tllis 
approach is justifiable taking into accotmt that regional seats would encourage Member-
States within a particular region to cooperate and work together. However, it can conversely 
be argued that such an approach may cause greater inefficiency in cases of disagreement 
between Member-States in a particular region. By way of example, Member-States witllin a 
particular region may disagree on wllich Member-State should hold a particular seat and for 
how many terms. Tllis disagreement may then have a knock-on effect on the work of the 
Security Council. 
The 'Model X' Proposal has also been examined under Chapter Two of this dissertation. This 
Proposal, as opposed to the others, creates a new class of membership wherein the new 
Member-States serve a four-year term which is renewable. Although this Proposal may seem 
justified it is arguable that by creating an additional class of membership as opposed to 
maintaining the current two-year tenure for non-permanent members, this may create 
inefficiency in the work ofthe Security Council as the rotation cycle of all the Member-States 
in the Council may become more complex. It is arguable that considering the five proposals 
to structural reform discussed in Chapter Two, the most ideal would be the Group of Four 
Proposal. 
The Group of Four Proposal is the most suitable option on the restructuring of the Council, in 
that, the Proposal itself recognises the emergence of Member States which play a vital role on 
the international scene. The Group of Four are a group of nations which wield a high degree 
of influence through the four nations' economic and military growth. An example of this is 
India. An article in the Economist recognised that 'if it [India] had a permanent Security 
Council Seat (which it has earned by being one of the most consistent contributors to UN 
Peacekeeping operations) it would not instinctively excuse and defend bmtal regimes.'75 
Additionally, Brazil is a Member-State which exercises substantial influence in the South 
75 'Can India Become a Great Power?', 30u' March 2013, <lillp2_;//www.economist.com/news/leaders/:fJ5745 ll-
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American region. Therefore, 'their [India and Brazil] presence on the Secmity Council would 
greatly increase regional representation'76 . As such this Proposal gives those Member States 
which have made substantial contributions in maintaining international peace and security an 
opportunity to continue doing so on a permanent basis. In addition to giving pennanent seats 
to Japan, India, Brazil and Germany under this Proposal there would be two pennanent seats 
allocated for African States. Moreover, there would be the creation of an additional four non-
permanent seats. With respect to these seats one seat would be allocated to Africa, Asia, 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
This aspect of the Proposal achieves the main goal of structural reform, which is to make the 
Cmmcil more representative. In addition to providing better representation to regions which 
have historically being underrepresented (for example, Africa and Asia) the Group of Four 
Proposal adds Member-States to the list of permanent seat holders. This is important because 
it acts as a buffer to the power and control which is currently exercised by the Permanent 
Five Member States. Tllis element of this Proposal sets it apart from others, for example, the 
Uniting for Consensus Proposal which focuses specifically on creating new non-permanent 
seats which maintains the current 'class-system' witilin the Security Council. 
However, it can conversely be argued that the Group of Four Proposal itself maintains the 
same 'class-system' by adding Member-States to the elite 'club' of pennanent members. 
Therefore, with respect to the various Proposals discussed in Chapter two of tllis dissertation 
the Group of Four Proposal would, if adopted, transform ti1e Cmmcil into a more 
representative organ which recognises ti1e emergence of Member-States wllich have grown 
economically as well as milita1ily. Furthermore, this Proposal recognises ti1e need to provide 
better representation to regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America in a proportionate 
manner. 
2.0 Recommendations on the Voting System ofthe Security Council 
As well as considering various Proposals with respect to the restructuring of the Security 
Council, this disse11ation has also aimed to address issues stmounding the debate on working 
76 Minor A, 'Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A Rope of Sand', Fall 2010, SIT Digital 
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methods as well as the voting system of the Council. Tllis is so because whilst 'the discussion 
on Security Council Reform primarily focuses on expansion of its memberslllp, some 
countries maintain that reforming the way the Cotmcil conducts its work is much more 
relevant and significant for Member States'77. When considering the working methods of the 
Council there has been sigtlificant change since the Council began its work. The initial 
Provisional Ru1es of Procedure proved to be beneficial however as the workload of the 
Council increased these Rules were amended various times to respond to this change. 
In addition to the Provisional Rules the issuance of two key President's Notes, the first being 
in 2006 and the second being in 2010, proved to be very important in evolving the working 
methods of the Security Council. These Notes encouraged the Council to become more 
transparent in its operations with respect to the wider United Nations Community. An 
example of tllls is with respect to the publication of the provisional agenda of fonnal Council 
meetings, which under the President's Note of2006 was recommended to be published in the 
Journal of the United Nations. Prior to 2006 this kind of Agenda was agreed privately 
amongst the Security Cotmcil members. The approach of re-assessing and amending the 
working methods of the Council has made the Security Council more accountable and 
transparent. This approach is ideal as the Cotmcil's work will continue to present new 
challenges which will require the working methods to also change to handle those challenges. 
As emerging threats to international peace and security continue to grab the Security 
Council's attention the best approach to such threats will be to constantly adapt the working 
methods to find solutions to such threats which also make the organ as accountable and 
transparent as possible. As well as considering the working methods, the use of the 'Veto' has 
also been of particular importance in this dissertation. Tills area of Security Council reform 
presents its own challenges. 
The presence of the 'Veto' in tl1e Cotmcil's work has lllstorical significance which can be 
traced back to formation of the United Nations at the behest of the five victors of World War 
Two. Therefore, there are proponents that argue that the existence of this privileged position 
of voting is justifiable on certain gt·ounds. By way of example an author of an article 
indicated that with respect to the question of whether the world would be a better place if the 
Permanent Five are stripped of their Veto Power 'the world will not be a better place, it will 
77 Lund J 'Reforming the Working Methods of the Security Council', 18°' November, 
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be a more tmstable place.78. Other grmmds on why retaining this power would be beneficial 
have been discussed in Chapter three of this dissertation. However, there are other 
stakeholders that argue that there needs to be refonnation of this reserved power which is 
currently only exercised by five out of fifteen Member States. It is arguable that ifthe ctment 
structure of the Security Cmmcil remains as it is going into the future then there is a need to 
limit to scope of the use of the 'Veto'. It would be justifiable for the ctment holders of this 
voting privilege to restrict the use of this voting power to certain key issues tmder 
international law. As such, disputes which involve genocide, crimes against humanity and 
mass atrocities should not be disputes in which the 'Veto' should be used. 
However, the above recommendation becomes more complex in the event that the Security 
Council is re-structured to include additional permanent members. If the Group of Four 
Proposal is adopted it is uncertain whether the new pennanent members would possess the 
same powers as the incumbent permanent members or whether the new permanent members 
would have restrictions on their voting powers. Despite these apparent uncertainties in the 
reformation of the Security Cmmcil the use of the 'Veto' should be restricted in order to 
permit the Council to carry out its work without adverse political influence, which it can be 
argued, has been a rectming challenge which the organ has had to deal with. A notable 
example of this being the Security Cmmcil's instability during the Cold War Period where 
disagreement existed between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 
3.0 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation has sought to examine the debate on reform of the Security 
Council by investigating structural reform as well as voting and working methods reform. 
Chapter Two of this dissertation has investigated five Proposals to alter the structure of the 
Council. The above discussion has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of these 
Proposals with the recmrunendation that the Group of Four Proposal would be the most ideal. 
Additionally, Chapter Three of this dissertation sought to analyse the evolution of the 
working methods as well as the voting system of the Cmmcil. This analysis resulted in the 
78 Krastev I, 'UN Security Council: Veto Option does more Good than Bad', 7°' October 2015, 
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recommendation that the working methods of the Cmmcil should continuously be amended to 
satisfy the ever-changing challenges that the Security Council will face. 
Moreover, a further recommendation was made that the use of the 'Veto' should be restricted 
and should not be invoked in situations which involve, inter alia, mass atrocities and crimes 
against hmnanity. The Security Council has come a long way in evolving in order to respond 
to the demands of maintaining international peace and security. This journey has involved 
amending the working methods as well as exploring possibilities in altering the voting system 
itself. Despite the progress which has been made, there is a need for the United Nations 
Community to come to a consensus to revamp the Security Council to better represent the 
entire United Nations Community as well as restore the legitimacy in an organ which plays 
such an influential role in international law. 
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